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CONFRONTING THE ETHICAL CASE AGAINST THE
ETHICAL CASE FOR CONSTITUENCY RIGHTS
WmLIAM W. BRATroN*

INTRODUCTION

Professor Ronald Green challenges the legal model of the firm on behalf
of its nonstockholder constituents. Green centers his challenge on the
model's principal-agent component. In his view, the fiduciary ideology
bound up in the agency concept erects a false ethical barrier to a redefined
firm.

This Comment makes two points in response. First, it asserts that the
principal-agent concept carries insufficient normative force to determine the
legal disposition of the constituency problem. Professor Green certainly has
good reasons for pointing our attention to the agency notion. Even minimal
suggestions of law reform to empower constituencies traverse deeply held
values, and the principal-agent concept appears prominently in the articulation of objections.' Agency thinking still prompts questions about the
legitimacy of the recently enacted constituency statutes and impedes the case
for their expansive interpretation. 2 But the law itself does not generate the
ethically-charged agency metaphor that Professor Green describes. Although
the agency model has its ethical presuppositions, it does not import a strong,
ethically-generated norm of absolute respect for beneficiary welfare and
subordination of fiduciary self-interest. Appearances deceive here-agency
plays a larger role in policy-laden academic descriptions of the doctrinal
structure than it plays in the underlying doctrine itself.
Second, this Commentary asserts that as we describe corporate law's
agency concept more fully, ethical and political barriers start to impede the
case for constituency rights. Corporate law's agency component does have
ethical implications for the constituency debate. It looms large because it
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1. See, e.g., William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. Cm. L.
R-v. 385, 421-24 (1990) (discussing importance of agency for management accountability);

Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities,Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment
of FundamentalCorporateChanges, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 175 (arguing that shareholders retain
ultimate right to control corporations because they value that right more highly than do other
groups).
2. For a survey of the range of interpretative possibilities with a plausibly middle-ofthe-road approach, see Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:InterpretingCorporateConstituency
Statutes, 61 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 14, 71-90 (1992).
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figures instrumentally in a wealth maximization story.3 The agency concept
may be only a metaphor at bottom, but theory of the firm discussants treat
it as if it were a component in a production model. Shareholder wealth
maximization by managers who play the role of agent is a norm because it
is assumed to be the means to the end of maximum wealth for the society
as a whole. It is not itself the end in view. Its ethical power derives from
the fact that, in a world of scarcity, more is better than less.
Thus, to join Professor Green in considering the ethical problems of
constituency injury is to restart an old debate over the desireablility of
redistributive regulation within the framework of corporate law. On the side
against mandated redistribution there come to bear factors such as wealth
production incentives, free market ideology, the legal inheritance, and the
agency model. On the side favoring redistributive intervention we see disrupted relationships, dashed expectations, pecuniary injuries, and disempowerment. In between the two sides lies a fragile, time- and incentive- dependent
pot of wealth. Corporate law's historical structure permits redistribution in
management's discretion but forecloses redistributive intervention. This
Comment predicts that the inherited structure will control in the immediate
future.
Part I of this Comment summarizes Professor Green's paper. Part II
discusses the methodological problem that arises when an ethical perspective
such as Professor Green's is advanced in legal academic contexts. It explains
why this Comment joins Professor Green in treating the problem in ethical
terms despite the legal academy's aversion to such discussions. Part III
looks at the doctrine and shows that its agency component does not bear
the ethical weight ascribed by Professor Green. Part IV describes ethical
problems that constituency rights advocates must confront. It suggests, first,
that in practice the problem of constituency rights should be conceived more
narrowly as the problem of employee empowerment, and, second, that
corporate law, viewed as an institution, offers a substandard framework in
which to make the employees' case.
I.

THm

PRINCIPAL-AGENT BARRIER TO THE CASE FOR CONSTITUENTS

Professor Green focuses on the role that the principal-agent model of
shareholder-management relationships plays in doctrinal and theoretical

models of the corporation. The principal-agent model is, in Professor
Green's view, a barrier that blocks the path to a constituency-based corporate governance model. In his description, this principal-agent barrier is

more apparent than real-a metaphorical device rather than an essential
cog in a machine of production. Once right-minded people who want to

3. Professor Green does note that the private enterprise system has "virtues of efficiency
and productivity" and that concern for the system figures into defenses of the existing system.
Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WAsK. & LEE L. REv. 1409, 1417 (1993). Green does not explore the independent

normative implications of wealth maximization.
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expand the operative model of the firm clearly see the barrier's outline and
character, they more effectively can direct a policy discourse toward its
removal.
Professor Green tells us that the principal-agent metaphor's preemptive
power derives from its ethical content. It is not just a descriptive concept;
it is also a moral stumbling block. Agency relationships are fiduciary
relationships. The characterization of the manager as the agent of a shareholder-principal therefore lends ethical force to the shareholder maximization
model of the corporation. 4 If the shareholder is seen as a beneficiary, an
ethical case arises for the shareholder's protection. That ethic dissipates
concern about injuries to other corporate constituents. Stakeholder injury
comes to be seen as injury inflicted in the course of performance of a moral
imperative. Discussion of implicit moral questions of shareholder benefit
versus stakeholder injury is preempted.'
In Professor Green's view, the agency metaphor's force diminishes if
we bring to bear an accurate description of the firm. 6 He refers to both
the separation of ownership and control and the absence of an institutional
framework allowing for negotiated contracts between shareholders and
managers. Together, these institutional realities undercut the factual case
for applying the fiduciary principle. Shareholders, furthermore, do not
resemble the beneficiaries of other fiduciary relationships. They are less
vulnerable because they can sell on the market-less vulnerable, in fact,
than the archetypical stakeholder, the at-will employee. 7 Finally, the shareholders' easy exit route denudes them of moral commitment to the firmA
Professor Green also dispatches other standard arguments in favor of
shareholder primacy. First comes Berle's warning to Dodd 9 of the dangerous
power that would flow to" the managers of a firm endowed with social
responsibilities. Second comes the warning of Easterbrook and Fischel,10
repeated often in the last decade, 1 that fiduciaries cannot coherently serve
two beneficiaries with conflicting interests. Professor Green responds that
analytical tools can be devised for dealing with the complex demands that
a multibeneficiary model would impose on managers. If they set their minds
to it, those in authority can develop frameworks of reasonable and defensible
priorities 2 without causing either super-empowerment of managers or an
outbreak of chaos.

4. Id. at 1410.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1413.
7. Id. at 1418.
8. Id. at 1414.
9. A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Haiv.

L. REv. 1365, 1367-69, 1372 (1932).
10. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAv. L. Rav. 1161, 1192 (1981).
11. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible
Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. Ray. 667, 735.
12. Green, supra note 3, at 1418. I agree that reasonable and defensible priorities can
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Professor Green does not assert that the "constituency statutes" added
to the corporate law of twenty-eight states during the 1980s' 3 mandate that
management articulate a multibeneficiary model along the lines he describes.
He makes reference to some very restrictive readings of these provisions, 14
and opines that they do not dislodge the principal-agent metaphor.

5

But

he takes care to leave a door open to more expansive readings. He would
like to see a new body of corporate law that sets out "varied priorities"
for corporate management. Shareholders would be primus inter pares, to
be considered first in day-to-day business decisions, but to be subordinated
when their interests threaten serious injuries to others.1 6 Corporate actions
not in the shareholders' immediate interests would not necessarily have to
be justified in terms of long-term shareholder gain; shareholder detriment,
short- or long-term, could be justified in the service of constituent protec7
tion.

1

This last point-Professor Green's insistence that moral concerns require
occasional disregard of long-term shareholder gain-takes us a step farther
down the road of constituency empowerment than do Professors David
Millon and Lawrence Mitchell, two of the constituents' more aggressive and
effective legal academic advocates. Both Millon and Mitchell offer interpretations of the constituency statutes that provide for constituent rights. Under
Professor Millon's reading, first, management should not seek short-term
shareholder gains that frustrate legitimate constituent interests, and, second,
management's business strategies should harmonize the shareholders' financial interest with the stakeholders' interest in stable relationships with the
corporation.'" But the constituents' interest in stability should not, says
Millon, be confused with a constituent right to permanent relationships.
His mediation of the conflict protects constituents only against "abrupt,
unfair disruption of relations" in the course of management toward the
end of long-term profit maximization. ' 9 The principal-agent model is relaxed,
but its outlines are left in place for the long-term. Professor Mitchell's
be developed to support a multibeneficiary model. See Patrick J. Ryan, Calculating the
"Stakes" for Corporate Stakeholders as Part of Business Decisionmaking, 44 RurGaas L.
REV.

555, 562-66 (1992).

13. For cumulations of the states with constituency statutes, see John H. Matheson &
Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover
Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1540-45 (1991); Orts, supra note 2, at 26-31.
14. Green, supra note 3, at 1411-12; see also The Committee on Corp. Laws, Am. Bar
Ass'n, Other ConstituenciesStatutes: Potentialfor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2269 (1990)
(interpreting statutes as confirming common-law duty to take other constituency interests into
account only to extent board acts in best interests, short-term and long-term, of corporation
and its shareholders); Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective,
46 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1375 (1991) (arguing that constituency statutes should be read as
codifications of common law).
15. Green, supra note 3, at 1412.
16. Id.at 1419.
17. Id.

18. David Millon, Redefining CorporateLaw, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 266, 267 (1991).
19. Id. at 268.
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reading also preserves a degree of shareholder primacy. He would leave in
place the instruction to maximize shareholder wealth, but require the board
to take constituent injury into account. Such injury could be justified in
the interests of the shareholders or the corporate entity, but, drawing on
the close corporation formulation of majority-to-minority shareholder fiduciary duties, Mitchell would hold open a door to a constituent showing
of the availability of a less injurious alternative. 20 Both Millon and Mitchell
thus carve out constituent rights at the expense of the shareholder primacy
norm, but, unlike Green, would not allow its total eclipse.
'II.

THm

ETmcAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF CoRPoRATE LAW

Professor Green speaks of the constituency problem in ethical terms.
He implicitly invites us to join him in discussing the characteristics of an
ethically defensible firm. At first glance, such talk might seem to be as
appropriate in this venue as it is in the business school where Professor
Green teaches. Business students get ethical education because they are on
a track to positions of power in corporations. Corporate legal academics
aspire to shape the law and thus shape the exercise of that corporate power.
So legal academics also should take time out to think about the ideal firm,
or so it would seem.
But Professor Green's invitation to ethical discussion is not so easily
accepted. It gives rise to an important question of legal academic methodology: Should (or may) a legal academic respondent also speak in ethical
terms, or should the legal respondent speak in the ordinary terms of legal
policy talk?
Ethical discussions occur in the ordinary course in business schools,
where business ethics are part of the curriculum. 21 In contrast, the legal
academy tends to avoid direct mention of business ethics, even though the
subject matter overlaps. The .legal custom is to talk ethics freely in two
contexts. One is demarked as jurisprudence, the other professional responsibility. Consider the latter. When we freely talk ethics in dealing with
ourselves in our professional roles as lawyers, we do the same thing that

20. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and PracticalFramework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TFx. L. REv. 579, 635-36 (1992).
It should be noted that Professor Green articulates his case for action that would not
be in the long-term interests of the shareholders by reference to the Bhopal disaster. A
substantial body of scholarship in favor of constraints on limited liability in respect of tort

claimants supports Professor Green's treatment. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991);
David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 1565
(1991). The articulation of a clear-cut distinction between Green's notion of constituency
empowerment and that of Millon and Mitchell may require the articulation of, a hypothetical
case focused on employee tenure rights.
21. Professor Green is not the only scholar of business ethics to take up the constituency
issue. See, eg., R. EDWARD FREEMAN & DANIEL R. GILBERT, JR., CORPORATE STRATEGY AND
THE SEARCH FOR ETmcs (1988); Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder
Analysis, I Bus. ETHIcs Q. 53 (1991).
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business people do when discussing the ethical implications of their own
conduct. Both of these theoretical discussions impact on internal, selfregulatory practices. Legal discussions of external regulation work differently. There the topic is application of the state mandate to others in their
working roles. The possibility of regulatory overreaching makes the subject
matter risky, and we avoid open consideration of the ethical implications
of the behavior discussed.
It thus is easier to project the characteristics of an ethically ideal firm
in a business school than in a law school. Legal scholarship is rarely
deontological, at least in terms. Some exercise of sovereign mandate always
shows up at the bottom line. Even so, occasional open recognition of the
ethical aspects of business law can benefit the discourse. But we should still
proceed with caution. Instead of working from the top down, and discussing
an abstract and universalized ideal firm, we should work from the bottom
up, and come to agreement on the ethical presuppositions that activate the
law on the books. Such talk may herald no immediate prospect of a new
legal mandate. But it does confer the singular benefit of making the operative
description of the law more accurate.
Business law, like all private law, is shaped by ethical presuppositions.
It has been noted that markets cannot function on self-interest only; they
require in addition a substratum of -moral conventions. 22 Legal decisionmakers, when they impose standards of conduct on business actors, evaluate
conduct by reference to a "should be." They draw on legal texts that set
out past statements of norms and reconstruct the norms for present application. In so doing, they synchronize values expressed in the law for
application against the unfolding background of business practice. This
process is recollective and interpretive, but also ethical.? The "is" of the
"law is" results from an imaginative reconstruction of what the law "might
have been." The decision becomes informed by aspirations about how
things "should be" in the process. Read this'way, the fiduciary rules that
we have in corporate law come down to us as artifacts of ethical judgments
rendered in the past.
Does a more accurate description of the law's dynamics justify the risks
that arise if we relax the norm against ethical discussions in policy contexts?
The custom of restraint addresses valid concerns. It stems from a healthy
philosophical skepticism. It serves the ends of cost reduction. And it protects
individual autonomy, particularly in normative policy contexts. None of
these concerns is preemptive, however.

22. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rav. 1, 18 (1988)
(citing A. Fox, BEYOND CONTRACT 1 (1980)).

23. Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and
the Potentialfor Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1135, 1145 (1988)
(viewing law as "recollective imagination through the retrieval of the embodied ideals of law,
a retrieval that releases the power of the 'might have been' through an appeal to the 'should
be",).
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First consider philosophical skepticism. Many observers make rational
tools available for the solution of descriptive, but not ethical, debates.
Ethics tend to be kept out of law to keep law under rational control. But
we can recognize the play of ethical presuppositions in our description of
corporate law without an outbreak of uncontrolled irrationality. Substantial
rational controls operate along with ethical aspirations in the practice of
24corporate lawmaking.

As to cost, the problem is that ethics may be expensive. But we can
acknowledge ethical issues at stake in corporate law without causing undue
suppression of cost considerations. Indeed, this Comment will argue that
the ethics which inform corporate law include cost considerations.
As to individual autonomy, the problem is that state-imposed ethics
impair freedom. But, in the context of corporate law duties, ethical presuppositions can be recognized without cognizable injury to freedom. This is
because corporate legal decisionmakers perform a function that is mediative
and relational as well as directive. They recollect the law not for abstract
application, but for present contexts shaped by present actors. They take
the actors' relationships into account. And they make adequate recognition
of the actors' relational roles an aspect of responsible lawmaking. This
respect for the actors becomes a constituent part of the ethic that motivates
the legal decision. Since the actors shape their roles for themselves over
time, they strongly influence the ethical context in which the lawmaker
interprets the law. As a result, the decisionmaker operates subject to a
significant constraint. Since the practice restricts the available ethical referents, a decisionmaker in this relational situation is unlikely to oppress an
actor by imposing an alien morality. Indeed, corporate lawmakers are so
respectful of the integrity of business actors that they contribute to the
problem addressed in the constituency discussion.
Academic discussion has a role to play in the evolution of the ethic
that informs business regulation. The ethic, as thus described, has a contingent, socially constructed character. It resists a discourse of universalization.
It is derived not from first principles, but from a process by which
individuals reflect on their past conduct and respond to present choices. 25
On this theory, individuals interacting in social contexts participate in the
making of their own moral rules. This process is dynamic-the individual
subjects are capable of growth, and the social context is capable of change. 26
Academic articulations of prevailing conflicts contribute to the process.
III.

THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL AND THE LEGAL STRucTuR

OF TIM

CORPORATION
Shareholder primacy is not absolute in the legal model. The principalagent model does not apply to corporations so as to impose an absolutely
24. Corporate law results from applications of communicative rationality as well as
instrumental rationality. See William W. Bratton, Public Values and CorporateFiduciaryLaw,

44

RuTGERs

L. REv. 675, 698-92 (1992).

25. AaiA WOLFE, WHOSE
26. Id. at 218, 222.

KEEPER?

216 (1989).
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stated management duty to protect shareholder interests. Instead, the legal
model mediates between the shareholders' interest and other interests in the
corporation, particularly that of management. The more closely we inspect
the principal-agent model's actual appearances in the legal corporation, the
less structural significance it carries.
A.

The Principal-AgentModel, the Corporate Entity and the Business
Judgment Rule
Consider the legal theory of the firm at its most general. The shareholders elect the directors and an agency relationship arises. But this agency
model of management rights and duties coexists in the law with an entity
model bearing some of the earmarks of a trust relationship. Under the
entity model, management is not the shareholders' agent, but the corporate
entity's agent. Corporate powers are original and undelegated; management
acquires them not from the shareholders, but from the charter, read in
connection with the statute. 27 These agency and entity models share a place
in the law without a precise statement of their relationship. For an example
of this practice, we need look no farther than the ambiguous statement of
corporate purpose included in the American Law Institute's recently adopted
Principles of Corporate Governance. According to the Principles, management should conduct business "with a view to enhancing corporate profit
and shareholder gain. "28Here an undefined, but obviously capacious concept
of a corporate entity, is conjoined with the shareholder and the agency
notion. Maximization language is eschewed in favor of an equivocal directive
to "enhance."
The legal model, then, includes the agency idea, but mediates between
management for the shareholders' benefit and a variety of concerns bundled
up in the opaque notion of the "firm." Both Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,29
the leading precedent for shareholder primacy, and A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,30 a leading precedent for a management privilege to
make charitable contributions, are good law. Under Barlow, the firm is
personified and considered as a separate actor in society. Social exigencies
come into the picture. The result is that management, far from acting solely
under the direction of and for the benefit of the shareholders, has the
power to give money away in "reasonable" quantities. Expanding on this,
the ALI Principles allow management to take cognizance of "ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible
conduct of business.''3 The constituency statutes take this a step farther
and confirm that constituency injury is one of the "ethical considerations"
encompassed.
27. See People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911).
28. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovRNANcE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Proposed Final Draft 1992) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES].
29. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
30. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
31. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, § 2.01(b)(2).

§ 2.01
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Corporate law, as it moves from the general to the particular, couples

the entity concept of the firm with the business judgment rule.3 2 As a result,
management gets considerable latitude to derogate from the shareholder

primacy norm as it makes decisions respecting investment, financing, and
operations.33 The door to close scrutiny of management decisions opens as
a practical matter only for the plaintiff who makes out a case of selfdealing. There, under the rubric of the duty of loyalty, the agency concept
makes its purest corporate law appearance. The duty is directed to the

immediate interests of a shareholder beneficiary. But entity concerns still
cloud the picture. The shareholders themselves are accorded enforcement

power, but as a practical matter they have to employ the retarding device
of an action taken in the name of the corporation. The corporate duty of
loyalty's treatment of garden variety self-interested transactions does closely
resemble the agency law treatment, 34 but in other situations its form and
application differ materially. The range of pertinent concerns becomes
particularly broad with corporate control transactions. The major corporate
law issue of the 1980s was whether these cases called for a strong application
of the principal-agent model. The back-and-forth responses of the Delaware

courts, 35 together with antitakeover legislation enacted across the country,
made it clear that the agency model does not determine the shape of this
branch of corporate law. Shareholder gain certainly figures in. But it comes
to absolute primacy only on the Revlon auction fact pattern,3 6 and it still
seems unlikely that the auction duty will come to bear in a large proportion
37
of future control transfer situations.
32. Id. § 4.01(c). The coupling of the entity concept with the business judgment rule
explains why charitable contributions and other ethically driven decisions figure into a small
body of caselaw. Public interest concerns have only one generally accepted zone of outcome
determination outside the charitable contribution privilege-the duty to obey the law. See
Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: CorporateFiduciariesand the GeneralLaw Compliance
Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REv. 413 (1991). This is a supplemental strain in the doctrine.
33. For an excellent description of management's latitude in making investment, financial,
and operational decisions, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, InterpretingNonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. Rv. 971, 995-96 (1992).
34. Compare ALI PRiNCIPLES, supra note 28, §§ 5.01-5.16 with RESTATE MENT (SEcoND)
OF AGENCY §§ 387-390 (1958).

35. Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), and
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) with Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
36. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173. The leading case scrutinizing an auction is Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
37. Revlon would have been at the center of future takeover litigation had it been later
interpreted to instantiate a shareholder choice norm, as some commentators suggested. See
Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 37
(1990). But, under Paramount,571 A.2d 1140, the auction duty is triggered only if management
abandons the entity and the values associated with it. See also Arnold v. Society for Say.
Bancorp, Inc., No. CIV.A. 12883, 1993 WL 526781 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1993).
Enhanced scrutiny of boardroom processes under the duty of care rubric, motivated by
the shareholder value norm, is suggested by QVC Network, Inc. v. ParamountCommunications
Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 2370 (Del. Ch. 1993).
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B.

Self-Dealing Transactions

The principal-agent model's ethical presuppositions lack preclusive structural force even in the core area of ordinary management self-dealing
transactions. Corporate fiduciary duties follow the general pattern of fidu-

ciary law. Generally, the fiduciary is not to take action that conflicts with
the beneficiary's interest; nor may the fiduciary take profits from its
position.3" The keystone corporate duty tracks the general model and restricts
self-dealing transactions by officers and directors. But, drawing from agency
law, corporate law relaxes the prohibition to permit self-dealing based on
informed consent.3 9 The agency permission, reconstructed to fit the corpor-

ation's governance structure, is conditioned on full disclosure along with
ratification by disinterested directors or shareholders. A substantive require-

ment of fair price also is imposed, 40 also in accordance with the general
4
pattern. '
Corporate fiduciary law, thus articulated, equivocates as it imposes a
norm of self-abnegation in the service of the interests of the shareholder-

beneficiary. It announces a strong fiduciary principle. But then, in a
synchronizing mode, it carves out endless exceptions, case by case. This

rule-and-exceptions approach lets it pursue economic goals while respecting

ethical concerns, and follows a general pattern of the law42 toward limited

toleration of self-interested conduct by the fiduciary.

38. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 16 (1975).
39. See ALI PpiNcimis, supra note 28, Pt. V introductory note a (distinguishing
corporate duty of loyalty from duty owed by trustee); Victor Brudney, CorporateGovernance,
Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 CoLum. L. REv. 1403, 1433-34 (1985).
40. The requirements of informed consent and fair price are thought to back up one
another's shortcomings. Fair price, taken alone, removes decisionmaking from corporate actors
to legal decisionmakers. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate
Law, 13 J. CORP. L. 997, 998-99 (1988). But without a fairness standard in addition to a
disclosure rule, the scope of judicial review would be substantially constrained.
41. This familiar corporate rule requiring a fair price and informed consent in selfdealing transactions applies to trusts in general. According to Scott, a self-interested transaction
may stand if the trustee makes full disclosure and takes no advantage of its position, and the
transaction is in all respects fair and reasonable. If done without the beneficiary's consent,
the transaction can be set aside even if fair and reasonable. See Austin ,W.Scott, The Trustee's
Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARv. L. REv. 521, 564-65 (1936); see also I AusIN W. Scorr, THE
LAW OF TRusTs § 2 (4th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTS § 170 (1959); RESrTATEaMNT OF TRusTs § 170(2) (1935); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958);
RESTATEmENT OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1933).

The corporate law constraint has undergone a gradual relaxation. Before 1880 corporate
law strictly prohibited self-interested transactions. Around the turn-of-the-century, it took an
approach close to the trust rule described by Scott. Then in the mid-twentieth century it
underwent a further relaxation, permitting ex post judicial fairness confirmation even without
disclosure and disinterested board ratification. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?
Conflict of Interest and CorporateMorality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36-40, 43 (1966).
42. Recent law reform attempts to constrain the imposition of fairness scrutiny on
director self-dealing transactions do, however, herald a break with the wider fiduciary pattern.
See ALI PRINCIPLEs, supra note 28, § 5.02.
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Fiduciary law's tendency to equivocate stems from the presupposition
that fiduciary relationships in business contexts would not exist in the first
place without wealth pursuit on both sides. Consider the subjective motivations of the actors in a classic. trustee/beneficiary relationship. The fiduciary acts for another, yet collects a fee and enters into the relationship
in connection with a wider program of personal wealth pursuit. The beneficiaries, however dependent on the fiduciary's loyal and diligent performance of the trust, themselves pursue self-interest in the relationship. Ethical
commitment and self-interested maximization jointly motivate both the
fiduciary and the beneficiary.
Ethical sacrifice and self-interested maximization also combine when
people produce in groups. We should not expect to see ethical commitments
show up in cooperative production situations absent individual welfare
pursuit. After all, actors work together in businesses in pursuit of their own
welfare. But, at the same time, individual welfare pursuit through cooperative endeavor entails commitments among the members of the group.
Motives of loyalty to other participants and group purposes influence the
actors. The cohabitation of these values and incentives creates tensions.
Corporate doctrine, again following the general pattern of fiduciary law,
mediates this tension.
When commentators justify fiduciary law in terms of a need to protect
the "integrity" of fiduciary relationships, 43 it thus turns out that fiduciary
"integrity" is comprised of a complex of values, some ethical and some
economic, to be "balanced" in the law. Theories of the fiduciary, says one
commentator, have to be congruent with the basic approaches of morality
and justice, and at the same time must adjust to the commercial realities
of the situation." Fiduciary integrity, then, is mediative: It encompasses
both ethical and welfarist concerns and strives to maintain a balance between
them.
C.

Summary

Once we look through the legal concept of the fiduciary to its complex
of ethical presuppositions, the legal concept of agency loses some of its
appearance of ethical power. Corporate law's fiduciary ideology operates
gently against self-dealing corporate managers in even the easier cases. So
equivocal is its place in the law of management control that commentators
unsuccessfully have been trying to infuse power into it for decades. This
commentary insists over and over that the fact that agency lies at the legal

43. Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OxioRD J. LEaA STUD. 285, 297
(1989); Weinrib, supra note 38, at 15-16.
44. J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of FiduciaryRelationships, 97 L.Q. REv.
51, 74 (1981); see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. Rnv. 795, 830 (1983);

Weinrib, supra note 38, at 2.
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model's core means that shareholder primacy should be the activating
principle when the law is applied. 45 Unfortunately, the management interest
has proved endlessly adept at maintaining its capture of the agencies that
make corporate law. The law, accordingly, never fully conforms to the
agency model. The concept does not sustain a central role in the constituency
debate.

IV. THE PRINCipAL-AGENT MODEL

AND THE

ETHIcAL ImpLmCATIONS OF

THE CONSTITUENCY DEBATE

A.

The Constituency Problem as Ethical Conflict
1. Constituent Dependence and Injury

We can widen and deepen our discussions of the constituency problem
if we accept Professor Green's invitation to relax the positivist constraint
that usually obtains in legal discussions and admit ethical considerations.
Reference to ethics, like reference to economics, takes us outside of the
inherited legal framework for a new look at a problem. We get a thicker
description in either case. Of course, with constituencies, reference to
economics thickens the description only substantially to ratify the law's
exclusion of constituencies. The economic commentaries do take the relational ties that bind stakeholders to firms into account. They tell a story
that recognizes that stakeholders such as employees and bondholders may
have reasonable expectations of institutional stability based on past relational
patterns. Abrupt changes in the patterns very well may frustrate those
expectations and justifiably be experienced as an injury. But the prevailing
'
conclusion is that these relationships amount only to "implicit contracts,"4
and therefore give rise to no rights. This results partly from a reference to
the legal inheritance and partly from application of an implicit norm. 47
Reference to ethics adds an element of urgency to the story of stakeholder injury. Moral intuitions instruct us on how best to behave in
situations in which it is in our power to counteract the extreme vulnerability
of others by being considerate. Ethics function as a safety device, compen-

45. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate Law:
Who's in Control?, 61 GEo. WASH. L. Rsv. 1177, 1178-79 (1993).
46. Compare Macey, supra note 1, at 181-95 with John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders
Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1986). Since
the contract is implicit, it imparts enforcement through nonlegal sanctions. See generally David
Charney, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HAv. L. REv. 373 (1990).

47. But cf. Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be
Compassionate?,43 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 315, 340-44, 345-49 (1993) (rejecting possibility of direct

enforcement of employee implicit contract but holding open possibility of protective gapfilling
on mutual mistake theory).
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sating for the vulnerability built into life in society.4 Thus described, ethics
have a tie to the satisfaction of social needs, a tie not dissimilar from those
49
of economics and law.
Recognition of these moral intuitions diminishes the strength of the
legal and economic presumptions against protection for stakeholders. Stakeholders, like shareholders, are vulnerable because they depend on the
corporation for their welfare. 50 All but a few individual constituents of
public corporations, whether stockholders, bondholders, or employees, come
to hold or develop their corporate ties without a meaningful opportunity
to negotiate a contract and make a considered trade off of short-term
payment for long-term security. Once we look past the existing system of
rights and compare the various firm relationships, distinguishing the. shareholders from the other constituents potentially fitted to self-protect through
contract becomes extremely difficult.5 1 It becomes plausible to ask whether
the existing system should be retained. Perhaps employee distress and
windfall gain to shareholders need not be concomitants when corporations
adjust to changing markets and new technologies. Perhaps some other,
more equitable, arrangement could be concluded.
The ethical case becomes stronger still if we step outside of the legal
framework and focus on the various constituents' contributions to the
collective profit-making endeavor. Successful collective production depends
on an extension of good will by each participant. That good will presupposes
reciprocity-each actor must be receiving his or her due from the organization for good will to arise. Reciprocal treatment accordingly becomes an
organizational norm that gets its content from past relational patterns. The
takeovers of the 1980s violated the norm for the unilateral benefit of one
interest group, the shareholders. Actors in the capital markets, in effect,
betrayed other interest holders in the firm. Those most betrayed were the
employees, the constituents who most actively participate in the firm's

48. Jurgen Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply
to Discourse Ethics?, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 38, 42 (1989). Habermas views the, autonomous
individual as dependent on interpersonal relationships. The more the individual becomes
individuated, the more he or she becomes entangled in a fabric of "mutual recognition,"
causing exposure and vulnerability. Id.
49. Says Habermas:
Moral philosophies of sympathy and compassion have discovered that this profound
vulnerability calls for some guarantee of mutual consideration. This considerateness
has the twofold objective of defending the integrity of the individual and of preserving
the vital fabric of ties of mutual recognition through which individuals reciprocally
stabilize their fragile identities.
Id. at 42-43 (footnote omitted). With this, ethics is associated not merely with the individual's
economic well being, but with the stability of the individual's personality.
50. Millon, supra note 18, at 225.
51. This point has been articulated from various other points of view. See Daniels, supra
note 47, at 326-29 (criticizing "narrow contractarian" approach to constituent claims); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment Contracts Within the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm,
43 U. ToaoNro L.J. 353, 357-59 (1993) (arguing that outcomes of bargains between labor and
firm are shaped by existing legal regime).

1462

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1449

mission.5 2 Recognition of this disruption of the relational pattern, like
recognition of constituent vulnerability, diminishes the force of the standing
presumption against stakeholder inclusion in the legal definition of the firm.
2. Agency and Wealth Maximization
Descriptions of constituent dependency and injury and capital market
betrayal only state the ethical problem that arises from the application of
the traditional legal definition of the firm in restructuring situations. Thus
to articulate the constituents' ethical case does not resolve the matter in
their favor. Professor Green suggests that resolutions in the constituents'
favor might follow if we take the additional step of reworking corporate
law's principal-agent story so as to denude it of its ethical implications.
This strategy is unlikely to succeed, however, for reasons both ethical and
practical.
As noted above, corporate law's agency component and fiduciary ideology are as mediative as they are morally prescriptive and allow much
latitude for self-interested pursuits by corporate managers.53 But, nevertheless, the agency concept does have significant ethical implications in the
constituency debate. These stem not from fiduciary ideology, but from the
principal-agent concept's structural position in the prevailing economic
model of corporate governance.
Economic models of the firm have the stated purpose of facilitating the
creation of maximum wealth. The models impose the principal-agent concept
on the shareholder-manager relationship as a means to this end. In economic
governance stories, managers, like all rational economic actors, have incentives to perform suboptimally when acting as agents. Exacting optimal
performance in the teeth of those incentives is the ongoing, unsolved problem
of corporate governance. The shareholders, as residual risk holders, have
financial incentives to use what weapons they have to prod the managers
to perform productively. 4 Corporate law assists them in various ways with
indifferent success-by regulating the voting process, maintaining a free
market in shares, and imposing the duties of care and loyalty.
The principal-agent metaphor looms large as a conceptual tool in the
ongoing struggle to get management under control. Shareholder primacy in
an agency framework thus is not the end- being served, but a means to the
end of maximizing the general wealth. The mainstream of contemporary
legal theory takes a significant additional step and limits discussion to the

52. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 48-53 (1991).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 27-44.
54. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & EcON. 301, 302-11 (1983). But cf. Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of
the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate
FiduciaryDuties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 26-31, 36-39 (1991) (preferring shareholder vulnerability to shareholder position as residual risk holder as justification for exclusive status as
beneficiary of corporate fiduciary duty).
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confines of this instrumental picture. It views corporate law as an instrument
shaped and constrained by the end of wealth maximization, to be appraised
and justified only in terms of its consequences on a dollars-and-cents
conception of human welfare. 5 The constituencies do not lose out in this
discourse because corporate law presupposes a moral commitment to the
shareholders; rather, they lose out because the discourse follows the advice

of Berle in his discussion with Dodd 6 and defers distributional questions
for reasons of economics rather than politics.
This economic welfarism may prevail in corporate law only by default.

People tend to come to the field presuming that we should think about

corporations in utilitarian terms. Economic welfare, although not necessarily
the ideal definition of utility, turns out to be the only workable definition
available. This follows even though the social sciences offer other, more
expansive concepts of welfare. These concepts look to well-being rather than
wealth 57 and often come to bear in legal contexts. But these expanded
welfare concepts come to bear on corporate law only tangentially. Serious
pursuit of an expanded notion of welfare, like serious pursuit of constituency
rights, implies a radical, context breaking move toward a social corporation. It also may be that many observers would support this move as an

55. Of course, in some contexts the description of corporate law opens opens up to
encompass the pursuit of power and leisure. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
Ecows. 305 (1976). However, the norm stays with dollars and cents.
The term "welfarist" is employed in preference to the term "consequentialist." Compare
Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89
CoLuM. L. REv. 1703, 1713 n.30 (1989) with Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean
Clark, 89 CoLuM. L. Rav. 1748, 1751 (1989). Clark defines consequentialism as assessing
things in terms of how much they increase or decrease the welfare of individuals. Kronman
finds this term unhelpful; he defines welfarism as making the welfare of those who live under
a normative regime the only basis for assessing its desirability. Id. This is utilitarianism under
either term. Compare David Lyons, Utility and Rights, in ETmcs, EcoNoMIcs AN TEm LAW
107 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (defining utilitarianism as "the
theory that the only sound, fundamental basis for normative (or moral) appraisal is the
promotion of human welfare") with KENT GREENAWALT, Co LicTs OF LAW AND MoALrnry
94-95 (1987) (defining utilitarianism as theory that "the morality of any kind of act will
depend on whether or not it will promote consequences more favorable than those produced
by some alternative").
56. Berle, supra note 9, at 1372.
Distributively speaking, of course, shareholder wealth is left to trickle down from
shareholder pockets, whether by means of consumption or investment.
57. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REv. 815
(1990). Hovenkamp criticizes "Chicago-style law & economics [for] trad[ing] away a broad
concept of 'well-being' based in the social sciences for a narrow concept-wealth maximization-based on market preferences." Id. at 835. Significantly, he notes that law and economics
assumptions seem "more plausible when the relevant actors are business firms and we assume
profit maximization." Id. at 846.
58. For an attempt to project a reformulated conceptual foundation for corporate law
that would break the context in the service of an expanded concept of welfare, see Elliott J.
Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System
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ideal proposition. But in the world of practice, and corporate legal theory
always keeps practice in mind, the wealth creation ethic blocks its recommendation absent a showing of a productivity advantage.
It was easier to hold to ethical and social ideals and make the economic
welfare assumption in the corporate law discourse of a quarter century ago.
In those days such discourse carried no apparent political costs. Nor did it
call for discomfiting ethical sacrifices. The policy sciences plotted various
routes, statist and social as well as free market, to the destination of
maximum wealth. One could make any of the antimanagerial assertions
usual in corporate policy discussions and stay within the welfarist framework. Law reform in the form of strengthened fiduciary constraints on
management was an everyday welfarist tool. Those advocating a social
corporation found a place in the discourse. The assumption was that wealth
enhancement no longer presented much of a problem. Given America's
apparently unassailable competitive position and expected technological improvements, welfarists thought that attention safely could be diverted to
matters of participation and distribution.
Today, however, intervening and continuing economic vicissitudes keep
attention focused on the bottom line. The upshot for constituent interests
is a widely accepted presumption in favor of the status quo. In this discourse,
the Chicago story about the efficiency of the inherited legal scheme 9 holds
much more strongly than elsewhere in corporate law. And, since wealth
creation is a community value and, indeed, a long-run priority for its weaker
and more vulnerable members, the presumption has ethical force. The
prevailing vision of the corporation as a wealth-creating mechanism has a
powerful ethical presupposition: In a world of scarcity and physical suffering, more wealth is central to what "should be" respecting production
organizations .60
This leaves the proponent of an expanded definition of the firm with
an extraordinary burden. It really will take a theory to beat this theory-a
prospective theory of wealth creation that includes constituent rights rather
than a theory of equitable allocation of an existing quantum of wealth.
3.

The Model of the Person and the Ethics of Microeconomics

The law's vision of the corporation as a wealth-creating mechanism also
implies a grim relational perspective: Since corporations are primarily in-

to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. Rnv. 343 (1981) (proposing "altruistic
capitalism"). For a critique, see Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and CorporateLaw Reform,
36 S AN. L. Rnv. 923, 965-66 (1984).
59. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1-15 (1991).

60. A response to the idea that corporations should focus on creating wealth can be
found in Lewis Solomon's paper in this symposium. He points to environmental limits and
suggests that growth be limited. Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held Corporations:A CriticalAssessment, 50
WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1625, 1633-35 (1993).
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struments of wealth production, individual participants should and do view
corporate participation in terms of individual welfare enhancement. The
wealth creation ethic and the individualist coloration of corporate relationships tend to appear simultaneously. They combine to weigh in against
constituency inclusion in the definition of the firm.
But, of course, injuries to personality occur in corporate life in addition
to injuries to pocketbook. The constituent who invests his or her whole
personality in firm participation suffers a deep injury from a sudden
restructuring. The case for employees must be distinguished from that of
other constituents. 61 Employee dependence is more than economic. A workplace is a quasi-community. Some element of identity will take shape in
connection with a long-term employment relationship. A bondholder, in
contrast, does not invest substantial personality in the relationship-indeed,
with bondholders, institutional ownership patterns make it hard to find a
flesh and blood human being to play the role of injured constituent.
In any event, the legal model of the firm and its implicit model of the
corporate actor is unreceptive to recognition of injuries to identity. The
normative choice is to model actors in reduced, economically-informed
terms. 62 The assumption is that although corporations take prominent places
in many lives, people's identities do not take shape in corporate communities. 63 Like the corporation itself, corporate actors are assumed to undertake corporate activities solely in the pursuit of material gain.64 Those who
stake their identities on firm participation do so at their peril; their only
recourse is protection through the institution of contract.
Some of the commentary further accentuates the legal actor's economic
coloration by conflating the legal actor with the purely self-interested rational
actor of microeconomics. Cast into that role, unprotected constituents have
no ethical case at all. The microeconomic paradigm, considered in ethical
terms, sees the primary ethical problem as the threat that state regulation

61. This proposition is worked out in detail in Terry A. O'Neill, Employees' Duty of
Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency Debate, 25 CONN. L. REv. 681 (1993).
62. The individualist strain appears most pointedly in contract law, which limits recovery
for mental distress to a very narrow class of cases. See, e.g., Valentine v. General Am. Credit,
Inc., 362 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1984).
63. People's identities take shape in communities in the strong sense described by Sandel.
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LmERALISm

AND THE Lmins oF JusTicE 149-50 (1982). One suspects that

"communitarians" would be particularly unlikely to conceive of their identities as the product
of the defining influence of business corporations.

There is an alternate view, of course, pursuant to which the corporate actor aspires to

form a corporate identity. The "organization man" of popular post-war culture sought to
conform to corporate cultural norms. But sacrifice was not the motivation: "he" did so in
exchange for a secure position. WmLLAM H. WH=rE, JR., THE ORGAH]ZATION MAN 75-76, 178
(1956).
64. According to Coase, given a preference for individual freedom, the choice of
production through participation in a firm over production on an individual basis can only be
explained as a means to the end of transaction cost reduction. See R.H. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMCA 386 (1937); see also Steven N.S. Chueng, The ContractualNature
of the Firm, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1983).
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poses to individual autonomy and private wealth creation. The imperative
of meeting that threat trumps concerns about the threat that legally sanctioned opportunism poses to the fabric of business relationships and the
well being of communities. Indeed, the very articulation of an ethical
component of the constituents' case is associated with the statist threat.
Nor does an ethic of protecting the vulnerable figure into the microeconomic vision of what "should be"-a world of self-reliance and selfprotection. Legal protection of constituents, if activated by an ethic of
protection rather than by an ex ante contractual calculation, only retards
the evolutionary disappearance of the helpless. It thus is suppressed in
microeconomic models of the law as a matter of ethical choice.
4.

Summary

The foregoing should not be taken as dismissing either the ideal of
constituency recognition, the seriousness of injuries to constituents, or the
ethical corrosion that results from legal sanction of that injury. But it does
reflect a judgment that substantial ethical problems would follow if these
concerns were transposed into a legal mandate. As a practical matter, the
solution of those problems and the mandate itself can come to corporate
law only as the result of a broad, sustained political process. Let us assume
that constituency rights would make us less well off due to production
disincentives and enforcement costs. A political consensus in favor of
constituency recognition would ameliorate the resulting welfarist objection.
Nothing prevents a polity from deciding to be less well off in pursuit of a
notion of the good. So long as the underlying conflict between economic
welfare and the ethic protection is controverted and discussed in the process
that gives rise to constituency rights, it cannot be said that the wealth
sacrifice unduly disregards anyone's material needs. 65 But that process has
a long way to go.
B.

Near Term Prospectsfor Constituent Inclusion

A redefined firm including constituency rights is always a possibility
for corporate law. But no breakthrough in the direction of a constituent
right of action seems likely in the near term. The reasons are many and
not hard to see.
Recent discussions focus on the question of whether the constituency
provisions that appeared in state corporation statutes during the 1980s
provide a present basis for a judicial declaration of constituency rights.
Those who disfavor the statutes, whether narrowly or broadly read, dismiss
them as the product of the antitakeover political climate that prevailed in
those days. 66 They have a point. The statutes did originate as interest group

65. See Bratton, supra note 11, at 685, 686.
66. Successful lobbying by the managers of large firms is a frequent explanation for use
of constituency statutes. See EASTERBROOK & FisCHEL, supra note 59, at 220-21; Roberta
Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111, 120-45 (1987).
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legislation, devised and enacted to make it safe for managers defending
against takeovers to refer to constituent interests in justifying their actions.
But these commentators, like all commentators who insist on shareholder
primacy as an absolute, also miss a point. Shareholder primacy is not the
law, and the statutes neatly fit the received legal framework. Although
management's lawyers drafted the statutes,6 7 and management saw to their
passage, they gain legitimacy from popular consensus against the open
market in corporate control that prevailed in the mid-1980s.
Commentators who propose broad readings of the other constituency
statutes also miss a point. They have characterized constituency injury as
an externality. With the injury thus placed in a legally cognizable slot, they
invent a tort to remedy it.6 But the analogy to tortious externalities, while
apt to some extent, does not complete the discussion. This is an allocational
problem arising from imperfect contracting in complex relationships. A
difficult cost-benefit decision remains open respecting the interpolation of
rights, and these commentaries tend to avoid confronting it. That confrontation is unavoidable in the present climate. A new tort action no longer
necessarily follows from the perception of a tortious injury. Now that the
person in the street has experienced the costs of the tort system, tort
67. See Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency
Statutes and Formulation of DirectorDuties, 21 STETSoN L. Rnv. 163, 163 n.2 (1991).
68. David Millon succinctly disposes of the tort action when he opines that the constituency statutes impliedly reject the efficiency norm and its premises. Millon, supra note 18, at
275 n.180. The other approach is to argue that constituency rights do not create an efficiency
problem but solve one. These interesting arguments certainly weigh into the final cost-benefit
analysis on the constituents' side. They do not determine the matter, however.
Larry Mitchell characterizes constituent injury as an externalized cost. Constituency
rights, on this analysis, force the internalization of the cost. Mitchell, supra note 20, at 58485; the approach is anticipated in Millon, supra note 18, at 275 n.180. Constituency rights
thus are presumably efficient, by analogy to the law of torts. The problem with Mitchell's
treatment lies less with the characterization of constituency injury as an externalized cost, than
with the conclusion that the efficient solution lies in the cost's internalization. Job loss and
bond event risk are not strictly analogous to air pollution and inattentive driving from an
economic regulatory perspective. For one thing, if takeovers have salubrious governance effects
and shareholder profit incentives are a necessary part of the governance dynamic, then the
efficient result may be to leave these "costs" where they lie. For another thing, these
stakeholders differ from tort claimants because they possess the theoretical opportunity to
contract to force the cost's internalization ex ante. The doctrine of disregard of the corporate
fiction, at least according to most commentators, is tolerant of the externalization of cost on
the creditor where it seeks to recapture an externality on a tort claimant. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Cm. L. REv.
89, 112 (1985); Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing
the Inquiry, 55 DENv. L.J. 1, 34-36 (1978). But cf. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CoRNELL L. REv. 1036, 1068-70 (1991) (noting that
piercing occurs more frequently in contract claims than tort claims).
The same points provide the basis for a response to Morey McDaniel's suggestion that
gains be redirected to cover all stakeholder losses and assure that restructuring transactions
are Pareto optimal. Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STnTsoN L. REv.
121, 126-39 (1991). Such gainsharing exercises presumably would retard market processes at
cost.
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plaintiffs are no longer favored figures in public policy discussions. Newly
minted torts, even corporate torts, are scrutinized strictly. Other modes of
legal recognition for constituents, such as management inclusion or ownership incentives for labor, resonate better.
The constituency statutes do bear expansive interpretation as a linguistic
and structural proposition. 69 But the statutes do not compel that interpretation. 70 A look at the context makes it safe to predict that we are unlikely
to see an expansive interpretation in the law. The fragmented process that
led to the statutes' adoption does not provide judges with a solid basis to
assume that a material expansion of the definition of the corporation was
the statutes' intended or inevitable role. The management driven process of
enactment did not force the implications of constituency empowerment
forward as matter for legislative consideration. These facts invite an ordinarily cautious interpreting judge to fit the statutes into corporate law's
inherited framework of management empowerment: Since constituency rights
disempower managers, the statutes do not imply them. 71 In any event, the
statutes have not yet prompted a leading case, 72 even as we now enter the
fifth year following the collapse of the 1980s takeover market.
Prospects for constituency inclusion do not look any better if we put
the statutory interpretation question to one side. Simply, the case for
constituents does not speak with the equitable urgency of five or ten years
ago. A special sense of tortious injury to constituents surrounded the
restructurings of the 1980s. But the perception of wrong did not stem from
73
the fact of constituent injury alone. It also had a restitutionary aspect.
The restructurings that caused constituent injuries were perceived as unnecessary transactions, means only to the end of windfall gain for Wall Street
actors. The story that justified them left open plenty of room for this view.
High debt and downsizing were said to be cures for suboptimal capital
reinvestment and ill-conceived conglomerate combinations. The story was
true-there can be no doubt many of the 1980s restructurings eventually
would have been forced by product and capital market competition. But
that long run was not perceived to present a near term problem for many
of the subject firms. This made the huge shareholder gains seem gratuitous
and exploitative. Surely, high debt, large payouts, and layoffs were not
69. See Millon, supra note 18, at 242-46, 265-70; Mitchell, supra note 20, at 630-39.
70. The point that the statutes can be interpreted expansively should not be taken to
assert that Millon, supra note 18, and Mitchell, "supra note 20, predict that courts will adopt
expansive readings of the statutes.
71. Here I am happy to make reference to Eric Orts' careful discussion of the statutes'
impact on standards of review under the duty of care. Orts, supra note 2, at 40-44.
72. Courts have brought constituency statutes to bear in upholding management defensive
tactics and devices. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31
(D. Me. 1989); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.
Wis.), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989);
Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Baron v.
Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
73. See McDaniel, supra note 68, at 128.
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inevitable concomitants; surely, if restructuring at the expense of some
employees was necessary, it should be justified in terms of a firm's future
as a competitor, not in terms of short-term shareholder maximization.
Now compare today's restructurings, which occur without the drama,
leveraging and shareholder windfalls of those of seven or eight years ago.
It is everyday news for a large firm, often but by no means necessarily a
firm known to be experiencing business reverses, to "restructure" by reducing staff levels five percent, ten percent, or more. 74 There is a consequent
shareholder benefit-the announcement can cause a sudden jump in the
stock price.7 5 Of course, from the employee point of view, this 1990s
restructuring differs from a 1980s restructuring only by degree-both sacrifice the employee's interest to the shareholder's. Yet one suspects .that
opinion about employee rights divides more to the side of management
discretion, now that the long-term business plan has its ordinary justificatory
effect. The allocational politics change also. Downsizing is like a recession
caused by a new Republican administration: Although it injures ten percent
of the working population, it benefits the other ninety percent that does
not lose its job (in addition to the stockholders and, here, the bondholders).
The winners now work for a fitter competitor, and the losers did not have
any job security anyway.
The equitable case respecting bondholder injury has undergone an even
more drastic diminution in strength. During the 1980s, wealth transfers
incident to restructurings affected the bonds of the. largest issuers in a
sudden break with past patterns. 76 The expectations of those holding bonds
issued prior to those events were palpably upset. But protective covenants
effective against these risks were designed. 77 These covenants appeared in a
substantial proportion of new bond contracts for a couple of years, only
to disappear in new issues by 1992.7 This occurred despite the, well-known
fact that the disappearance of takeovers did not imply the disappearance

74. Layoffs of 225,000 employees were announced in the first half of 1993. Large
manufacturing and service companies are downsizing in part due to slow expansion of domestic
markets and recession in export markets and in part due to management's long-term projection
of slow growth, overcapacity, and keen price competition on a global basis. See Louis S.
Richman, When Will the Layoffs End?, FoRTuNE, Sept. 20, 1993, at 54, 54. White collar as
well as blue collar workers are affected. In 1992, middle management positions composed
more than 20% of jobs eliminated. Lisa Baggeman, The Futility of Downsizing, INDUSTRY
WK., Jan. 18, 1993, at 27, 28.
75. See Richman, supra note 74, at 56 (noting Union Carbide stock increase).
76. See William W. Bratton, CorporateDebt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DuKE L.J. 92, 136-42; John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate
Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEo. L.J. 1495, 1505-09, 1515-19 (1990).
77. See VICTOR BRUDNEY & Wn.LLw-W. BRATToN, BRUDNEY & CinmmsmrN's CORPORAm
FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 205-06 (4th ed. 1993) (quoting Steinwurtel & Gardner, Super
Poison Puts as a Protection Against Event Risks, 3 INSIoHTS, Oct. 1989).
78. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisionsin Bonds: Bondholder
Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. Ray. 931, 969-71 (1993).
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of easy ways to transfer wealth from unprotected bondholders2 9 Although
such events retain some shock value, they are not unexpected. Since bond
prices reflect the presence or absence of protective covenants,80 the contract
failure argument 8' has become harder to make.Y2 Most will see a case of
actors who had a chance to protect themselves and chose not to do so in
exchange for a present payment. The legal definition of the firm does not
appear to require readjustment in order to protect these people, or, more
precisely, these portfolios.
Political pressure for change may further diminish as small-scale corporate restructurings continue in the absence of constituent rights. Downsizing and cost reduction have come to replace constant growth in the
ordinary business plan. Expectations change as a result. Insecurity begins
to become an intrinsic part of the corporate employment relationship.83 The
pattern of employee investment in firm-specific assets may diminish in
response, and with it the gravity of the injury. At the same time, efficiency
arguments against legal inhibition of restructuring activity will continue to
be made, tailored to the new circumstances. 4 No doubt the new institutional
investor activists stand ready to channel these points into the political arena.
C. Redirecting the Discussionfor the Long Term
The Berle-Dodd debate of a half a century ago" covered all points
made in today's discussions about constituencies. Expanded definitions of
the firm also were considered in the corporate governance discourse of a
generation ago. 86 The contemporary debate once again confirms that corporate law includes conceptual bases for its own transformation in the
direction of constituency inclusion. It also reminds us that economic wel-

79. Lately, issuers have been initiating wealth transfers by spinning profitable divisions
off so as to leave existing bonds attached to weak, highly leveraged divisions. See BRUDNEY
& BRAT-rON, supra note 77, at 220-21.

80. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 78, at 974-75, 979-80.
81. See id. at 980-82.
82. The change in the picture of bondholder expectations makes it difficult to support
a right under the contract law good faith doctrine. See Victor Brudney, CorporateBondholders
and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HAgv. L. REv. 1821 (1992), and
Bratton, supra note 11, both of which advocate a good faith duty with power to substitute
for covenants and constrain opportunism in respect of bonds issued prior to the appearance
of new event risks. Only a transformative shift to complete fiduciary protection will support
a bondholder right. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of CorporateBondholders,
65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165 (1990).
83. See Baggerman, supra note 74, at 27 (noting that employees remaining after downsizing encounter significant added stress and may no longer trust the company).
84. See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 865-66 (1993).
85. Compare Berle, supra note 9, with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. Rav. 1145 (1932).
86. For a synthesis of the literature on expanded definitions of the corporation, see
Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance
System to Resolve an InstitutionalImpasse, 28 UCLA L. REv. 343, 418-34 (1981).

19931

ETHICAL CASE

farism does not completely describe corporate law-that those who conceive
of the law only as a means to realize our material aspirations overlook
points at which ethics of sharing and protection presently or potentially
affect the law.87
But the inherited legal definition of the firm still prevails, despite the
disruptions of the 1980s and the sudden recognition of constituencies in
corporate statutes. Norms of protection for constituents still figure into
corporate law on a strictly secondary basis. Following Berle's recommendation, we still vindicate them primarily as a matter of outside regulation.
Since the concepts themselves do not dictate this result, we need to
look elsewhere for an explanation. The wealth-maximization norm provides
a part of the answer, but it plays a determinative role mainly in academic
discussions. To explain the practice, further reference must be made to
corporate law's institutional framework. There the salient point is management control. Constituency rights would disempower management. Constituency statutes, in contrast, empower management in the likely event that
they import no independent constituency rights. They merely extend the
pattern of the fiduciary law of takeover defense; there management discretion remains the dominant theme despite suggestions to the contrary in cases
like UnocaP8 and Revlon. 9 Corporate law never tends to stray very far
from management empowering results, as a general proposition. Delaware's
position as the corporate jurisdiction of choice assures this result.
We cannot look to Delaware to redefine the firm and break the context.
The possibility of an outbreak of regulatory competition keeps it faithful
to management interests. Nor is there much point in looking to any other
state. Management makes its influence felt nationwide. Furthermore, lawmakers can be expected to be disinclined to undertake reform schemes that
carry any risk of wealth depressive effects and feel well justified in so
doing. And even if a maverick jurisdiction made a different assessment and
sought to limit management's discretion respecting constituencies, it would
encounter difficulties at the implementation stage. Since it might lose the
charters of its larger firms to other states, its authority as a practical matter
extends only to the interests of constituents within its borders.9 Difficulties
87. Cf. Amartya Sen, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, 1 J.L. EcoNs. & ORGANIZATIONS
341, 341 (1985):
The ability of groups and societies to deal with conflicts of interests, and of goals,
among their members depends largely on the way individuals think and act and how
they assess their respective objectives, achievements and obligations.
Id.
88. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
89. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
90. Under the internal affairs principle of United States conflict of laws doctrine, host
states to foreign corporations honor the law of the incorporating jurisdiction governing internal
relationships. See REsTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF CO UCT OF LAWS § 302 (1971). Only local
matters are regulated. This, however, can extend to some aspects of foreign corporations'
internal affairs. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990) (applying sections of state
corporations code to foreign corporations that meet tests concerning location of assets,
employees and shareholders).
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might arise even at home because the regulated firms would cpmpete in
outside product and capital markets. If constituent regulation is costly, then
in the long run the maverick jurisdiction materially disadvantages those
firms.
At the bottom line, then, the constituency rights discussion collapses
into the state competition discussion. 9' This gives rise to two questions

about the direction the discussion has taken: First, whether corporate law
is the appropriate venue, and second, whether constituent injury should be

the principal focus. We take a leaf from Berle here, 92 but not because the
contemplated redefinition of the firm would empower management. Con-

stituency rights are intrinsically disempowering to management. We look to
-Berle for the proposition that law reform to control inappropriate corporate
conduct should originate outside the corporate law system.

On the first question, whether corporate law is the appropriate venue
for discussion of constituency rights, note two facts. First, no state has an
incentive to act unilaterally, and, second, an evenly distributed federal
mandate ameliorates the problem of product and capital market competition.

These facts suggest that this law reform discussion should be redirected to
the federal arena. Note also that labor is the preeminent constituency. The
state corporate law system opens a door to labor empowerment through

the purchase of control. 9 But collective action problems make that door
hard to open. State law otherwise remains committed to labor disempowerment, and no theoretical manipulation of loose basic concepts is likely to
shake that commitment. It is an uncongenial environment in which to pursue
a fundamental restructuring of labor's rights. 94

91. For other discussions of the point that the constituency rights theory collapses into
the state competition model, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1492
(1992); Michael E. DeBow and Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholdersand Corporate
Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 393, 405-15 (1993).
92. See Berle, supra note 9.
93. The most prominent recurring candidate for an employee buyout is UAL. A third
round of negotiations was in the news during the fall of 1993. As of this writing, both the
pilot's union and the ground crew worker's union had approved an employee buyout plan. A
shareholder vote, expected in the spring, is still necessary to approve the deal. Airlines, L.A.
Timss, Jan. 29, 1994, at D2. For a description of an earlier round of negotiations, see Coffee,
supra note 76, at 1521-28. For a description of recent experiences with employee ownership
of large firms, see Alan Hyde, Ownership, Contract,and Politicsin the Protection of Employees
Against Risk, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 721, 737-39 (1993).
94. Law reform to strengthen the rights of dislocated employees has proceeded on the
federal level in recent years. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988) (requiring employers to give 60 days notice of plant closing or
mass layoff to union or employees, State dislocated worker unit, and local government; statute
became effective in February 1989); Economic Dislocation Worker Adjustment Assistance Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1662c (1988) (creating State dislocated worker units to plan for provision
of services in wake of plant closings). Various states and localitites also have enacted legislation.
A few states mandate severance benefits. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51o (West Supp.
1993) (mandating 120 days' paid group health insurance); ME. Ra,. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-
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On the second question, whether the discussion should focus on constituent injury, note that productivity concerns cannot be avoided in any
facet of this discussion-they figure into legal, social, and ethical, as well
as economic, calculations. The constituency rights discussion thus also
collapses into the broader discussion of the theory of the firm. There the
problem for solution is the organization of the firm for effective cooperative
production. Allocations of rights follow from the resolution of that problem;
firm structures do not result from juridical dispositions of rights. A case
can be made out for labor in this context. It lies with the promise of
productivity gains through information-sharing." Models of the firm designed to capture that value center on co-ownership or legally mandated
co-determination." This approach aligns the case for employee rights with
both the economics and the ethics of corporate production. The constituency
debate, in fact, has begun to surmount its tendency only to look backward
to adjust past allocative patterns and move simultaneously in this direction.Y
The ax ante case for labor inclusion has a long way to go, however. The
matter ultimately devolves into the amount of wealth to be accessed and
the ancillary costs of new arrangements, especially in respect of equity
capital. 9

It bears noting that structural modifications to facilitate more effective
inputs of human capital need not entail full codetermination or equal
coownership. A model of intermediation might suit better at first, given the
pervasive and cautious view that the law should not impair management's
authoity to run the business. That is, the employees would receive a legally
B (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (one week's current wages for every year of service). A longterm attack on the practice of employment at will also continues at the state level: In 1991,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a Model Employment-Termination Act for submission to state legislatures. See 9A Lab. Rel. Rep., (BNA)
540:21 (Dec. 1991). For a survey of present and proposed legislation and suggestions for
further reform, see Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and
America's Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1860-83 (1993).
Severance benefits also are provided by contract, sometimes by willing managers. During
the 1980s, management defenses included "tin parachute" plans, pursuant to which employees
departing during a set period following a takeover receive lump sum payments. See Patrick J.
Ryan, Corporate Directors and the "Social Costs" of Takeovers-Reflections on the Tin
Parachute,64 Tut. L. REv. 3 (1989).
95. For a description of productivity through information sharing, see Marleen A.
O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate LaborManagement Cooperation, 78 CoRNELL L. REv. 899, 922-27 (1993).
96. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 Cm. KENT L. REv.
159 (1991); O'Connor, supra note 95, at 946-65 (suggesting "neutral referee" variation on
codetermination); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1335,
1368-86 (1991) (describing cooperative form of enterprise).
97. See O'Connor, supra note 95; Hyde, supra note 96.
98. Henry Hansmann has suggested that worker ownership is viable only if the workerowners have homogeneous interests. In other cases, the properties of collective choice mechanisms create significant barriers. For a summary of his views, see Henry Hansmann, Worker
Participationand Corporate Governance, 43 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 589 (1993). For criticism, see
Hyde, supra note 93.
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mandated right to advise-if not the board itself, then designated intermediaries. Such a scheme would bring them inside the legal firm only to allow
information flow and consultation. The objective would be to influence the
contractual evolution of governance norms to assure that the firm responds
to employee concerns. 99
Even such a modest plan seems visionary in this country at this time.
But a more receptive future environment can be projected. We can take the
current pattern of retrenchment and leaner management practice and project
the twenty-first century firm. Assume a world economy characterized by
technological advances, declining costs, increasing labor productivity, and
decreasing growth of labor income. 100 In this environment, the skills of the
firm's managers will be as much directed to trimming capacity and redeploying capital as to making new capital investment. To stay competitive,
this twenty-first century organization will have to be too flexible to permit
its participants to make the mistake of thinking it to be an institution that
endures and protects indefinitely. It will not have the luxury to stumble
into a web of unproductive relational patterns, and will have to develop a
strong internal control system to prevent their development. 01 This projection creates a problem. The more pure and market-like this competitor
becomes, the more difficult it becomes to imagine incentives for firm specific
investment and full exploitation of production information by its managers
and employees. Cooperative production is ill-suited to an organizational
model that procures its inputs of human capital on an exclusively armslength, at will basis. Yet, in this scenario, such cooperation will be demanded
as a means to the end of productivity.'0 If competition discourages the
trust that arises in more settled conditions, then investment of human capital
may depend on new rights. In a world in which the risks of attachment to
a given firm loom larger because of constant competitive demands to exit
from lines of production, more flexibility respecting voice and distribution
of residual returns may be required to stimulate that investment. The
particular mix of contract and legal mandate necessary to secure such
arrangements is left to the reader to project; but a mix there will be. 03

99. Several European countries have a system ensuring firm response to employee
concerns. See G. Schnorr, European Communities, in COMPARATnvE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTR RELATioNs 65, 72-74 (R. Blanpain ed., 1982). Rights of consultation and participation
are included in the European Economic Communities' Community Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights, COM(89)248 final.. For discussion, see David C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights
in the Post-1992 European Communities: What "Social Europe" Means to United StatesBased MultinationalEmployers, 11 Nw. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 564 (1991). Worker participation
rights appear as a law reform suggestion in the American literature. See O'Connor, supra note
95, at 962-63.
100. For a detailed projection of the twenty-first century firm, see Michael C. Jensen,
supra note 84.
101. Id. at 862-70.
102. Cf. Baggerman, supra note 74, at 28 (noting that small businesses, while least likely
to resort to layoffs, have become more productive).
103. A "just so" story can be told from the rational expectations side: If equity
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CONCLUSION

Corporate law has a remarkable capacity to afford conceptual building
blocks to those who desire its fundamental reform. Its principal-agent
component gives shareholder primacy advocates an excellent basis to contend
that management should not be privileged to thwart takeovers. At the same
time, its gestures in the direction of community responsibility and its openended fiduciary principle make it plausible to argue that constituents should
have rights. Somehow, neither shareholders' nor other constituents' programs seem to find a way into the law, despite support in the law's literal
terms. Corporate law is an institution that holds a commitment to management.
The fact that context most probably controls should not be allowed to
obscure the important contribution made by today's constituency rights
advocates. Their work destabilizes settled assumptions about the inherited
legal framework. Lawmaking proceeds in a more flexible climate. We will
need that flexibility as competitive forces continue to change corporate
institutions.

participation is needed to stimulate human capital investment, contractual arrangements will
evolve.

